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Abstract: Southern Cone economies exhibit a high record of exchange rate volat-
ility. In this context, rms tend to contract dollar debt, irrespective of their
trade orientation, and without available hedging instruments. This exposes them
to bankruptcy risk, in the event of large exchange rate movements. This paper
provides a framework to analyze the output eect of exchange rate uncertainty
in that context, by focusing on the channel uncertainty-output that operates
through the nancial strategy of the rm. We nd that increases in exchange
rate uncertainty increase the probability of bankruptcy, thus increasing expected
marginal bankruptcy costs, and reducing optimal output of a risk-neutral rm.
Furthermore, we nd that rms with higher than average liquidity balances will
face lower marginal bankruptcy costs, thus producing more than the average rm.
The model displays persistence, as any shock to current prots aects future li-
quidity balances, and so, future output. This framework can easily be extended
to explain the response of other rms' decisions to exchange rate uncertainty,
such as investment.
JEL Classication: F31, G33, D81
Key Words: Exchange rates, Bankruptcy Costs, Production Under Uncertainty1 Introduction
Developing countries have experienced higher exchange rate volatility than de-
veloped countries. Southern Cone economies, where exchange rate risk hedging
instruments have been unavailable until recently, show particularly high volatil-
ity records, which generate high exchange rate uncertainty. In this context, rms
contract dollar-debt, which leads to currency mismatches in their balance sheets,
and expose them to exchange rate risk.
Given these characteristics, in this paper we investigate the output response
to a rise in the degree of exchange rate uncertainty faced by competitive rms,
and consider as separate cases rms producing non-tradable and rms producing
tradable goods. We focus on the eects of increases in uncertainty that increase
the probability of extreme exchange rate outcomes. Most of the literature on the
link between uncertainty and economic activity overlooks the eects of the nan-
cial strategy of the rm, relies on exogenously determined attitudes to risk and
on distributional assumptions that mainly reduce uncertainty to the variance of
the random variable. This paper focuses on the channel linking uncertainty and
output that operates through the nancial strategy of the rm. In our model,
rms rely on credit markets to nance working capital, and contract dollar-debt.
The rm faces bankruptcy in the event of an exchange rate outcome that makes
the debt repayment larger than the output proceeds. Therefore, it internalizes
the expected bankruptcy costs when making the optimal output decision, thus
showing aversion to bankruptcy risk. To identify the pure-risk eect on output
we focus on changes in perceptions that lead to a higher probability of extreme
exchange rates, keeping a constant mean. Our analysis does not rely on distribu-
tional assumptions of the exchange rate.
Our main results are the following. First, when rms exhibit currency mis-
matches, obtaining revenue in pesos and repaying dollar-debt, an increase in
exchange rate uncertainty reduces optimal output, as the marginal bankruptcy
costs increase. The anticipation of generalized government bailouts in the event
of drastic exchange rate movements exerts the opposite eect on output. How-
ever, our contention is that in the event of high uncertainty, rms will not take
bailouts for granted and will act cautiously, hoarding liquidity and disengaging
from risky activities. Second, rms' liquidity balances matter for the choice of
output: rms with high liquidity balances will face low bankruptcy risks, which
leads them to produce more than the average rm. This introduces persistence
in the output eects of shocks to prots because any shock to prots, such as a
reduction in output prices, or a depreciated exchange rate, will decrease rm's
next period liquidity balances, and so, next period's output.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents dif-
ferent timing scenarios associated with production, describing the sources of ex-
change rate uncertainty in each of them. Section 3 discusses two limitations of
the standard theory of production under uncertainty: the oversimplication of
the concept of uncertainty, and the absence of discussion on the nancial strategy
of the rm. Section 4 presents a production model for a competitive risk-neutral
rm producing non-tradables. We rst discuss the eects of increases in expected
depreciation. Then, we incorporate the possibility of bankruptcy and analyze
2the output eects of increases in uncertainty. Section 5 analyzes the case of a
rm producing tradable goods, the possibility of government bailouts, and rm
reactions to irreducible uncertainty. Section ?? concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Uncertainty in the Production
Decision
Uncertainty arises when the consequence of a decision is not a single sure
outcome, but a number of possible outcomes. Figure 1 shows three production
timing scenarios to visualise the sources of uncertainty in the production decision.
(Sc1) Certainty: The rm produces in period one, when inputs are transformed
into output instantaneously, with known output and input prices. The
proceeds of the output are used to pay inputs. Everything is known with
certainty.
(Sc2) Two Periods, No Working Capital Needs: In period one the rm
makes a commitment to produce and xes input prices. In period two,
inputs are transformed into output instantaneously. Output prices are re-
vealed, output is sold and the proceeds are used to pay for the inputs. Firms
do not need working capital. When making the production decision they
only face uncertainty with respect to output prices.
(Sc3) Two Periods, Working Capital Needs: Here, production takes time.
The production process starts in period one, when inputs are purchased,
but it is only in period two when output can be sold. Working capital needs
arise. Firms contract dollar-debt in period one at the risk-free interest rate
(we assume no default risk). In period two, output prices and exchange rates
are revealed. When making the production decision rms face uncertainty
with respect to output prices and the peso-cost of the dollar debt. Under
these conditions, output decisions are risky investment decisions.
Sc(2) and Sc(3) seem to better describe reality than Sc(1). Forward contracts
are a way to reduce exposure to real exchange rate risk. However, these have not
always been available, and if they have been, costs were prohibitive.1
3 The Limitations of the Standard Approach
Two limitations of the standard approach for the analysis of production under
uncertainty are discussed here.2 In Section 3.1 we focus on the validity of a
1This assertion is based on an informal discussion with the Secretariat of the Uruguayan
Union of Exporters. In addition, as argued in Borensztein et al. (2008) this seems to apply to
Argentina as well. In Brazil, only large rms use forward contracts, and still it is a recent trend.
It is argued that because these countries have had xed or predetermined exchange rate regimes
for long periods, rms frequently have not internalized exchange rate risk as an additional cost,
given that the Central Bank was implicitly oering an insurance against variations. That could
help explaining absence of a better developed forward market for the exchange rate.
2For \standard approach" we understand the work of Sandmo (1971), Hawawini (1978),
Leland (1972), and what is found in most Microeconomics textbooks. E.g.: Gravelle and Rees
(1992).
3Figure 1: Timing of the Production Decision
mean-variance analysis (M-V), and in Section 3.2 on the implicit assumptions
the standard production theory makes on the capital structure.
3.1 Is the Variance a Good indicator of Uncertainty?
The analysis of the impact of uncertainty on output frequently reduces the
concept of uncertainty to the variance of the random variable. That implies that
either the utility function of the decision maker is quadratic, or that the probab-
ility distribution of the random variable can be fully characterized by parameters
of location and scale (with all other parameters being denite functions of these)
(See Gravelle and Rees (1992)). How reasonable are these restrictions?
\In economics, the relevant probability distributions are not nearly
Gaussian, and quadratic utility in the large leads to well-known ab-
surdities". Samuelson (1970)
To illustrate the problems associated with the assumption on the utility func-
tion, take a quadratic function as in equation (1):
U() = a + b + c
2 (1)
(where a > 0, b > 0, c < 0).
(1) Agents display negative marginal utility of prots when these exceed  b=2c.
(2) Agents display increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). Pratt (1964) denes
absolute risk aversion (ARA) as r() =  u00()=u0(). If r0() > 0,
agents display IARA. For a function as in (1), r() =  2c=b + 2c, and
r0() = 4c2(b + 2cx) 2 > 0.
4Instead, what seems to be widely accepted is that agents typically display de-
creasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). Pratt (1964), for example, suggests that
\people might generally pay less for insurance against a given risk the greater
their assets" [pp. 122-3], implying DARA. The common ndings in the empirical
literature support the hypothesis of DARA.
Let us turn the attention to the implications of the assumptions on the dis-
tribution. Distributions that dier only by location or scale will have shape
parameters that are functions of location and scale (or constants). An example
is the Normal, in which the parameters of location () and scale () fully char-
acterize the distribution, and measures of shape, such as skewness and kurtosis
are constants (= 0, and = 3 respectively). In the context of nancial studies,
it is generally claimed that probability distributions of asset returns cannot be
fully parameterized by measures of location and scale as they may also dier in
measures of shape.3
An example helps to illustrate why reducing the analysis of uncertainty to
that of mean and variance of the random variable is inadequate if distributions
also dier in shape.
Figure 2: Volatility that \breaks" versus volatility that \bends"
3In fact, an unpublished manuscript of Samuelson suggests \Full-Scale Optimization" (FSO),
a methodology in which return distributions are used in their entirety (Hagstromer et al. (2007)).
The computational burden of this method is signicant, and won't be considered here. For more
on FSO, see Cremers et al. (2005).
5Figure 2 shows the behaviour of two series: \Fixed" and \Flexible". Fixed
exhibits an extreme episode in periods t = 23 and t = 24, and it takes a con-
stant value equal to one for the rest of the period. Flexible shows permanent
and mild variation. Would agents perceive the same degree of uncertainty with
respect to the value that \Fixed" will take tomorrow and with respect to the
value that \Flexible" will take tomorrow? Probably not. Assume now that
\Fixed" and \Flexible" are prices of two goods. The behaviour of Fixed has
more scope for large eects on, say, accumulated prots than that of Flexible.
The producer facing Flexible faces mild or \bounded randomness" whereas that
facing Fixed faces \substantial randomness". Uncertainty associated with the
former is somehow controllable by averaging while that associated with the latter
is less so. Using a M-V approach, we would consider both series as equivalent
(E[u(Fixed)] = E[u(Flexible)]), as \Flexible" has been constructed by drawing
random numbers from a normally distributed population, such that the obtained
series approximates to a normal distribution and E(Flexible) = E(Fixed), and
V (Flexible) = V (Fixed) ( = 1:005 and  = 0:08). It is possible to have a
change in which location and scale don't alter, but shape does (kurtosis in our
example). Then, a M-V analysis will give the wrong answer. When distributions
dier by location, scale and shape, the decision maker will not only look at mean
and variance, but also at higher moments of the distribution. (In this case, for
example, the kurtosis of \Fixed" is 66, while that of \Flexible" is 2:6.)
Take two countries, with dierent real exchange rate generating processes. In
one, the process is consistent with low-probability extreme events (such as the
series \Fixed" in Figure (2)), in the other, is consistent with a low, constant
variance (such as the series \Flexible" in the same gure). If uncertainty af-
fects the behaviour of producers, then it is reasonable to expect a larger eect,
and therefore a more cautious behaviour of producers in the former country than
in the latter, even if during a particular time period, the series shows to be stable.4
We cast doubt on the validity of this distributional assumption for the ran-
dom variable being the real exchange rates (RER) in Argentina, Brazil and Ur-
uguay, as these countries have had xed nominal exchange rate regimes, with
mild variations in RERs, and then, collapses of these regimes with extreme RER
movements in several occasions during the period of analysis. In Table (1) we
present the rst four central sample moments of the distribution of the growth
rate of the RER over four dierent time periods.5 The variations in the estimates
of the parameters of shape (skewness and kurtosis) are evident. For illustrative
purposes, we take two subperiods for Uruguay (last three rows of Table (1)) in
which mean and variance of RER growth are similar, but skewness and kurtosis
4Daniel Heymann has coined a distinction between the volatility that \breaks" and the
volatility that \bends". This distinction came up in the context of an informal discussion on
exchange rate uncertainty generated by xed versus exible exchange rate regimes in Southern
Cone countries, where currency crises are relatively frequent. Then, Heymann claimed that,
frequently, xed exchange rate regimes experience \underlying volatility". This is unobservable
until it is so large that \breaks" the regime and generates an extreme episode. Underlying
volatility in the context of exible exchange rate regimes, on the other hand, manifests imme-
diately, no matter how large it is, through movements in the exchange rate. Thus, it is less
likely to accumulate and generate an extreme episode.
5We have arbitrarily chosen the time periods to illustrate the likely inadequacy of this
distributional assumption.
6change signicantly, suggesting that these distributions do exhibit changing pat-
terns in their shape.6 Thus, the M-V approach seems inappropriate to deal with
the randomness of the RER. To capture uncertainty, we will need to take into ac-
count higher moments of the distribution of the relevant random variable, besides
the looking at mean and variance.
Country Period Mean Variance Skeweness Kurtosis
Argentina 1970m1-1978m12 0.006 0.021 4.428 25.334
1979m1-1991m12 0.013 0.048 7.230 68.257
1992m1-1998m12 -0.001 0.000 -0.743 3.646
1999m1-2004m12 0.012 0.005 3.866 19.327
Brazil 1970m1-1978m12 0.001 0.000 -0.895 5.346
1979m1-1991m12 0.003 0.002 1.315 7.152
1992m1-1998m12 -0.001 0.000 0.335 5.845
1999m1-2004m12 0.007 0.003 1.616 8.200
Uruguay 1970m1-1978m12 0.003 0.009 7.791 74.843
1979m1-1991m12 0.002 0.007 7.475 78.328
1992m1-1998m12 -0.004 0.000 0.949 7.816
1999m1-2004m12 0.005 0.001 2.012 14.909
1996m1-2002m12 0.003 0.001 2.998 23.099
2003m1-2004m12 0.003 0.001 -0.596 4.881
Ho:Same ,  p-value 0.4413 0.3196 0.000 0.000
Table 1: Sample moments for the Growth Rate of the RER
3.2 Are the rm's nancing decisions innocuous?
All references to the capital structure of the rm were ignored in our initial
exposition of the eects of RER uncertainty on output, which relied on tools of
the standard theory of production. When the rm operates in Sc(3), there is a
lag between the moment in which the production decision is taken and inputs
are purchased, and the moment in which the revenue from the sale of output is
obtained, working capital needs will arise. The nancial strategy of the rm may
add extra uncertainty, and will not be innocuous for optimal output, as we will
show in Section 4. Here we discuss some of the options the rm may face in terms
of its capital structure, and some of their implications.
Firms could nance working capital needs in excess of the available internally
generated funds by issuing equity, or borrowing. When they choose the rst
alternative, the rm diversies risk. However, as argued by Myers and Majluf
(1984), rms generally do not issue equity to nance working capital needs. The
authors nd that the announcement of equity oerings reduces stock prices in a
signicant manner. They argue that informational imperfections are a plausible
explanation for this nding. The manager of a rm is asymmetrically informed
about the value of the rm. For this reason, if the manager decides to issue stock
at a given market price, the investors are only going to be willing to buy it at a
lower price, exerting downward pressure on stock prices. That reduction in rm
value would be a substantial \cost to false signalling", to be avoided if rms can
6We test equality in means, and equality in variances and report the p-values in the last row
of the table.
7rely on debt-nancing.7 In this case, creditors will not interfere with managerial
decisions, but risk will not be diversied, and if the rm cannot meet its nancial
obligations due to adverse market conditions or poor management, debt will be
unforgiving, and the rm will face bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is to be avoided
by managers because if it happens, they will suer a stigma as it is dicult to
distinguish whether the nancial distress is due to poor management or due to
adverse market conditions. This is why, as Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) argue,
managers are averse to bankruptcies and will internalize its expected costs when
making the production decision.
Now, if rms tend to use debt as a source of nancing, the currency structure
of that debt needs to be considered, for in the countries under analysis and
over a large portion of the period considered, dollar-debt contracts have been a
common phenomenon, largely independent of the trade orientation of the rm.8
The existence of dollar-debt contracts brings us to Sc(3) presented in Section
2, in which there is another channel through which RER uncertainty will aect
production decisions.
The reasons behind debt-dollar contracts are debatable. In general, banking
lending rate dierentials between domestic and foreign currency were signic-
antly above devaluation expectations - at least those devaluation expectations
that explained the banking borrowing rates' dierentials (Licandro and Licandro
(2003)). A myopic nancial manager would then choose to borrow in foreign
currency, as it is the apparent cheaper option. However, even if the agent is
forward looking and foresees a large exchange rate depreciation, it may be temp-
ted to borrow in foreign currency. This is because if all other agents are doing
the same (and he's aware of that), a large depreciation would generate chained
bankruptcies, and a collapse in the payment system of the economy. Because the
social costs of that outcome are socially undesirable, then a debtor bailout could
be ex-post optimal for the government. This induces rms not to internalize the
exchange rate risk, and instead, rely on an implicit \free insurance" provided by
a lender of last resort (the government). (See Burnside et al. (2001)).9 Another
view argues that dollar debt was deliberately fostered by the governments in these
countries in order to show a commitment to the xed exchange rate regimes. By
making the costs of a devaluation extremely high, the government tried to gain
credibility (see Levy-Yeyati (2006)) . In some cases,and mainly for long terms,
peso debt was just unavailable. Whatever the reasons behind this phenomenon,
the existing data reveals that it was widespread in Argentina and Uruguay, and
though less prevalent, still signicant in Brazil. Kamil (2004) oers some indic-
ators in this respect. His database provides unique information on the currency
and maturity structure of rms' liabilities for 10 Latin American countries.10 The
debt-dollarization ratio, calculated as dollar-linked debt as a percentage of total
liabilities, is for Argentina during the 1990s, well above 50%, for Brazil, it was
lower but still signicant and in the range 11-20% during the decade, while for
Uruguay the same ratio was in the range 74-84%. It is also possible to see that
7Another explanation for the reduction in stock prices after equity issues is that there is a
downward sloping demand for a rm's shares. (See Myers and Majluf (1984))
8For example, Galiani et al. (2003) argue that in Argentina, debt dollarization was \the
rule rather than the exception", and found no relationship between the production mix, or the
probability of a sudden nominal devaluation and the degree of debt dollarization.
9The optimal output implications of this are discussed in Section 5.2
10The dataset covers a wide variety of rms, of dierent size and trade orientation.
8dollar-debt seems to be longer term than non-dollar debt. In the case of Argen-
tina, for example, the ratio of long-term dollar liabilities to total dollar liabilities
is in the range of 30-55%, while the ratio of long-term non-dollar liabilities to
total non-dollar liabilities is in the range of 11-21%. For Uruguay, the former
ratio is in the range 23-54%, while the latter in the range 3-17%.11
A framework for the analysis of output decisions under real exchange rate
uncertainty should incorporate these elements into account. This is what we do
in next section.
4 An Alternative Approach: A Production Model
with Bankruptcy Costs and Dollar-Debt
Here we present a simple production model with two key characteristics: pro-
duction takes time, and rms nance working capital using dollar-debt contracts.
The rm operates in Sc(3). We start by considering the output eects of increases
in expected depreciation, then we introduce bankruptcy costs, and attempt to an-
swer what is the output eect of mean-preserving increases in exchange rate risk.
We start by looking at the case of a rm producing non-tradable goods, and then
discuss the implications for one producing tradable goods. Our model owes most
to Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
4.1 The Model
The rm is neutral to risk and produces a non-tradable good whose price is
determined domestically. The rm operates in Sc(3). A single input is used to
produce. It is bought at the beginning of the period in a perfectly competitive
market. Output is only sold in the period after production, in a perfectly com-
petitive market. For these reasons, the rm needs working capital to buy inputs.
Working capital can only be borrowed in foreign currency from nancial markets.
The exchange rate is expressed as dollars per peso, and it is a random variable.
At the beginning of the period, the rm inherits liquidity balances of size a.
These balances are generated by last period's dierence between the revenue from
the sale of output, and debt repayment.
The price of the only input equals w and is determined in a perfectly compet-
itive input market.
This leads to a level of foreign-currency denominated debt B, along with
a nominal interest rate to be paid to the lender, R, which is inherited at the
beginning of next period. The peso-value of the debt repayment is unknown
today, and will depend on the exchange rate prevailing in the next period.
The following assumptions are made:
(A1) Production Technology: Firms produce using only one input, and the
production process exhibits diminishing returns. The input requirement
function is (q), with 0(q) > 0, and 00(q)  0. Note that the input
requirement function is the inverse of a production function. Let A be the
eciency parameter of this production function. For simplicity, we assume
A=1.
11There is no data available for Brazil in this respect.
9(A2) The Source of Randomness: The exchange rate, measured as dollars per
peso, is a random variable ~ e. The expected depreciation over the period,
e = e0=~ e1   1 = 0. ~ e is distributed with distribution function F~ e(:) and
density function f~ e(:)
(A3) Dollar debt: The level of debt is determined by the dierence between
the value of the input bill, and the liquidity balances of the rm at the
beginning of the period. Debt can only be contracted in dollars. The peso-
value of the repayment to the creditor in the next period is random, as so
is the exchange rate.
(A4) Prices: There is only one good produced in the economy. To be able to
focus on exchange rate uncertainty only, we exclude price uncertainty, and
assume a xed price. The fact that exchange rate volatility tends to be
substantially greater than price volatility supports this assumption.
(A5) Bankruptcy: Default risk is zero. Firms don't go bankrupt.
(A6) Creditors' market: Creditors are risk neutral and perfectly informed.
Expressed in pesos, rms borrowing needs, B, are given by today's dierence
between the input bill and the inherited liquidity balances:
B = (w(q)   a) (2)
In foreign currency, B$ = B  e0. What is to be paid back to the creditor
in pesos, is known once the exchange rate is revealed next period, and equals:
B$ = B 
e0
~ e1
= B  (1 + ).
To choose the level of output to be produced, managers will maximize an
expected end-of-the-period wealth function which can be re-expressed as in (3):
maxqE

pq   (1 + )(1 + R)(w(q)   a)

(3)
The rst order condition is:
p   (1 + R)(1 + 
e)w
0(q) = 0 (4)
Prots are a concave function of q when 00(q) > 0. The second order condition
is:
  (1 + R)(1 + 
e)w
00(q) < 0 if 
00(q) > 0 (5)
4.2 Increases in Expected Depreciation
Proposition 1. Optimal output is a decreasing and convex function of depre-
































[w00(q)]2 > 0 (11)
Higher depreciation expectations increase the expected peso-cost of working
capital, and induce rms to decrease output to produce at lower marginal costs.
The relationship is shown in Figure (3).12
An increase in eciency, A, increases optimal output (the rate at which q







Figure 3: Optimal Output - Expected Depreciation
12The gures for input price and dollar-cost of borrowing are analogous.
114.3 Bankruptcies
We now relax A5. When rms' capital structure relies on debt, as argued
here, the risk of bankruptcy emerges. Bad states of the world may prevent the
rm from meeting its nancial obligation due to what Baxter (1967) calls a state
of \nancial embarrassment". Bankruptcy is costly for rms, and thus to be
avoided. We divide costs into direct and indirect costs:
(1) Direct (administrative and restructuring costs): these entail trustees' fees,
legal fees, referees' fees as well as the time spent by the managers in litig-
ation, plus, if the rm is forced into receivership by creditors, then costs
associated with production disruptions, etc. These are likely to be increas-
ing in rm's size.
(2) Indirect (opportunity cost of lost managerial energies): \nancial embar-
rassment" may aect the stream of operating earnings because of diculties
in obtaining trade credit, disruption in customer relationships, etc. In ad-
dition, as argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), bankruptcies will aect
the future prospects by managers, and that eect is likely to be increasing
in output. This is because the choice of output levels is a signicant role of
managers. Bankruptcy with high levels of output should reect unfavour-
ably on their ability to do this. It implies bad judgement by managers and
may thus be unusually costly to their future prospects.
Firms will take the probability of bankruptcy into account when making op-
erating decisions, if the costs associated with that outcome are of sizable mag-
nitudes. Warner (1977), for example, argues that bankruptcy costs are insig-
nicant. He uses data on railroad rms in the US and calculates the ratio of
bankruptcy costs to the market value of the rm, and nds this to be at around
1% when the rm's value is considered seven years before bankruptcy, and rising
to about 5% when the rm's value is considered one year before bankruptcy.
However, his focus is mainly on direct costs. In an attempt to quantify both
direct and indirect costs, Altman (1984) compares predicted prots (using data
corresponding to three years before bankruptcy) with actual prots and obtains
an estimate of bankruptcy costs for industrial rms close to 17:4% of their value
three years before bankruptcy. Opler and Titman (1994) reported that during
downturns, highly leveraged rms facing nancial distress tend to lose substan-
tially more market share than their more conservatively nanced competitors |
this points to a signicant indirect cost of nancial distress.
The specication of bankruptcy costs is a moot point, but it seems reason-
able to think they are increasing in output, because a) direct costs depend on
rm's size, and b) indirect costs | and mainly those related to the manager's
reputation, are likely to increase as output increases. In addition, as argued by
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), for the possibility of bankruptcy not to be ever
ignored, bankruptcy costs must increase in output. Otherwise, if, say, they are a
xed cost, prots (increasing in output) may grow so large relative to bankruptcy
costs that these are eventually ignored.
In what follows we assume that the associated costs are increasing in output
in the form described in equation (13), for the reasons outlined here:
Bankruptcy Costs = cq (13)
124.4 Solvency Exchange Rate and Ouptut
Because the rm borrows in foreign currency to nance working capital, there
is a bankruptcy risk associated with exchange rate levels that would make the
debt repayment higher than the output proceeds (the rm operates now in a
modied Sc3, with default risk). Lenders can invest their wealth at the risk-
free dollar-rate, r, so their expected return from lending to the rms must be,
in dollars, at least r. The contracted interest rate at which rms borrow in the




(1 + R)(w(q)   a)e0
~ e1
 pq (14)
A critical value for the exchange rate in period 1,  e1, that leaves the rm just
solvent, assuming e0 = 1, for simplicity can be obtained from (14):
 e1 =
(1 + R)(w(q)   a)
pq
(15)
If in period 1 the exchange rate turns out to be lower (more depreciated) than
 e1, the rm goes bankrupt, while if it is higher (less depreciated) than  e the
rm remains solvent. Notice that the solvency exchange rate,  e1, is the promised
repayment per unit of revenue.
Firms in better than average nancial shape (i.e. those with above average
inherited liquidity balances (a)) will survive relatively more depreciated exchange
rates than the average rm before becoming bankrupt. The lower the portion of
working capital that is nanced through debt, the larger the depreciation needed







The relationship between  e1 and output is explained by whether production
technology exhibits diminishing, constant or increasing returns. We discuss the
cases of diminishing and constant returns (both consistent with competitive equi-
librium, and the former, with A1). We don't consider the case of increasing re-
turns as that case would lead to a monopolistic outcome, with endogenous prices,
which is out of the scope of this model. Note that  e1 is a ratio between costs
and revenue. Look rst the case of a = 0, in which rms do not inherit liquidity
balances. All input purchases are nanced through debt. If as output increases,
costs increase at a slower rate than revenue, then, a more depreciated exchange
rate is needed to bring the rm to bankruptcy (and conversely).
For any production technology the relationship between the solvency exchange










To be able to sign equation (17), we will assume a Cobb-Douglas production
technology. That implies (q) = q1=. We focus on situations in which rms
borrow, i.e.: w(q)   a > 0, and a  0. Let us consider two cases:
13(1) If  < 1 ) Diminishing Returns ) 0(q)q > (q) ) de=dq > 0. As
output increases, working capital requirements increase at an increasing
rate 0(q) (00(q) > 0), while revenues increase at a rate p. This implies that
increases in output increase exposure to bankruptcy because they increase
the size of debt relative to that of expected revenue. It follows that less
depreciated exchange rate realizations will bring rms to bankruptcy, as
output increases.
(2) If  = 1 ) Constant Returns ) 0(q)q = (q) ) de=dq  0. If a = 0,
then,  e is constant. Both costs and revenue increase at a constant rate (w
and p respectively), and the ratio remains constant (red line in Figure (4)).
Figure (4) shows the relationship between  e1 and output for the two cases
discussed. In each case, we consider three dierent levels of liquidity balances
(zero, \low", \high").
Figure 4: Solvency-Exchange Rate and Output
4.4.1 Lenders' Return and Equilibrium Solvency Exchange Rate
The solvency exchange rate dened in equation (15) can be used to dene
the dollar-return of lenders, (1 + ~ r), as function of the random variable ~ e1, as in
equation (18):
(1 + ~ r) =
(
(1 + R) if ~ e1 >  e1 (Solvency)
pq
(w(q)   a)
~ e1 if ~ e1   e1 (Bankruptcy) (18)
Its expected value, (1 + r) equals the sum of the promised return times the
probability of solvency plus the output proceeds relative to the debt, valued at
14the expected exchange rate conditional on bankruptcy (which equals
R  e1
 1 xdF(x),
where x is the exchange rate and F(x) its distribution function). This is presented
in equation (19):
















We re-arrange equation (19), and consider the case of constant returns to
scale, with (q) = q. This yields equation (20), which shows, on the left-hand
side, (h(q)), the expected repayment per unit of revenue as a function of output,
and on the right-hand side, (z( e1)), the expected repayment per unit of revenue as
a function of the solvency exchange rate, which in turn is equal to the promised
repayment per unit of revenue. Thus, (20) expresses the implicit relationship
between the level of output produced by the rm and the corresponding exchange














= z( e1) (20)
Figure 5: Output-Solvency Exchange Rate
A plot of that implicit relationship between output and the solvency exchange
rate is useful, as it allows a more intuitive understanding of the link. This is what
we do in Figure (5). The left quadrant of the gure maps the relationship between
the rm's promised repayment per unit of revenue (the solvency exchange rate),
and the expected repayment per unit of revenue. The right quadrant shows the
relationship between the level of output and the expected repayment per unit of
revenue. Now, consider an increase in the level of output. That will increase the
expected repayment per unit of revenue. Consequently, the promised repayment
per unit of revenue must increase as well. And that promised repayment equals
the solvency exchange rate,  e
1. Therefore,  e
1 increases in q. Given constant
returns, an increasing production makes the rm vulnerable to less depreciated
exchange rate outcomes. Notice that as q increases towards innity, h tends to
15(1+r)w=p (which must be lower than 1, if output is positive), while  e1 approaches
a nite limit  e0
1, which solves equation (21).
w
p












At the same time, the promised repayment per unit of revenue must be 1
when the rm is insolvent for any realization of the exchange rate: as  e0
1 tends
to innity, z( e1) tends to E(~ e1) = 1. This means that as q tends to innity, the
probability of bankruptcy tends to a nite limit, F( e0
1). For a prot maximum
to exist, then at equilibrium levels of w and r, p (1+r)w  cF0 < 0, otherwise,
q could be increased without bound. This condition holds for a suciently large
value of c.
Proposition 2. The solvency exchange rate of equilibrium is an increasing func-
tion of q, convex and increasing of w, and a convex decreasing function of p and
a.
Proof. To nd the equilibrium response of  e1 to changes in q, w, p or a we use











Using equation (22) we conrm that in equilibrium, the sign of the responses of
 e1 to changes in a and in q are consistent with those showed in equations (16) and
(17) respectively. In equilibrium, the more the rm produces, the less depreciated
exchange rates needed to bring it to bankruptcy (equation (23)). Increases in
output increase their exposure to bankruptcy, because the rate of change of debt
is higher than the rate of change of expected revenue as output increases. Second,
that the higher the rm's liquidity balances, the more depreciated exchange rate
is needed to bring the rm to bankruptcy (equation (24)). And  e
1 decreases at
an increasing rate with a, because higher values of a not only decrease the size
of the debt, but they also decrease the required promised interest payment to
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(1 + r)f( e
1)d e
1=da
[(1   F( e
1))pq]2 > 0 (25)
Analogously we show that a higher output price takes more depreciated ex-
change rates for the rm to go bankrupt, while the converse applies for a higher
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1=da(1 + r)(wq   a)
[(1   F( e















(1   F( e
1))2 > 0 (29)
The probability of bankruptcy, illustrated in Figure (6) can be expressed by
substituting the solution value of  e1,  e
1 into F( e1).
P(Bankruptcy) = 1   F( e

1(:)) (30)
Figure 6: Exchange Rate Distribution: Solvency and Insolvency Zones
4.4.2 Optimal Output Decision
To choose the level of output to be produced, managers will maximize ex-
pected wealth at the end of the period (akin to an expected prot function) as
presented in equation (31) that incorporates the standard components (i.e.: ex-
pected revenue from output sale minus expected repayments to lenders) minus
an expected cost of bankruptcy, subject to equation (20). Bankruptcy costs are
as in equation (13) for the reasons argued in Section (4.3).
maxqE
(






17Equation (31) can be re-expressed as in equation (32), given that expected
depreciation is zero (so, E(e0=~ e1) = (1 + e) = 1)
maxq
(
pq   (1 + r)(wq   a)   cqF( e1)
)
(32)
The rst order condition can be expressed as:
p = (1 + r)w + MBC (33)






















(1   F( e
1))pq
(34)
Increases in output increase expected bankruptcy costs for two reasons: rst,
for a given probability of bankruptcy, higher output means higher bankruptcy
costs, at a rate c. Second, increases in output increase the probability of bank-
ruptcy. This is because increases in output increase the critical exchange rate at
which rms are just solvent. Note that if the production technology exhibited
increasing returns, then the sign of MBC would be a priori ambiguous. An in-
crease in output would increase the costs of bankruptcy for a given probability,
but the eect on the probability of bankruptcy would be ambiguous.
The optimal level of output, q can be found just by plugging in equation (34)





p(1   F( e
1))(p   (1 + r)w   cF( e
1))
(35)
The second order condition equals the opposite of dMBC=dq. q consistent
with equation (35) corresponds to a prot maximum if and only if dMBC=dq > 0,






























































The sign of equation (36) depends on the sign of [f0 + f2=(1   F)]. Given
that bankruptcies are rare, it is reasonable to think that solvency exchange rates
tend to be on the lower tail of the exchange rate distribution (as illustrated in
Figure (6)). We discuss this further in Section 4.5.1 and here we make that
assumption. If the distribution is unimodal, then f0 is positive at relevant levels
of output. That implies dMBC=dq > 0. Marginal bankruptcy costs increase in
output, and the second order condition of a maximum holds. Figure (7) shows
18the equilibrium where the MBC curve cuts from below the net marginal revenue
curve (net marginal revenue= p   (1 + r)w).
Irrespective of where in the distribution are the rm's solvency exchange rates,
if the hazard function of the exchange rate distribution is monotonically increas-
ing, then dMBC=dq > 0. This is because, as shown in equation (37), an increas-
ing hazard function implies f0+f2=(1 F) > 0. The hazard rate can be thought
as the probability of a value of the exchange rate, e1, occuring, given that a set
of values feg < e1 have not occurred. An increasing hazard function means that
the likelihood of a realization of the exchange rate e1, conditional on no lower























Figure 7: Firm maximising behaviour with costs of bankruptcy
Proposition 3. Optimal output increases with prices and with liquidity balances
if the rm operates with solvency exchange rates in the lower portion of a unimodal
exchange rate distribution.
Proof. Proposition (2) expresses that  e
1 is decreasing in output prices, which





















[pq(1   F(e)]2 < 0 (38)
The output eect of an increase in output prices, can be seen in Figure 7. It
increases net marginal revenue at the same time as it decreases the MBC. Both
eects lead to an increase in optimal output. Analytically, we nd the optimal











Optimal output is increasing in a. By inspection of equation 33, it is possible
to see that dq=da is the quotient of  dMBC=da and dMBC=dq. Because higher
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The last result is relevant because it implies persistence. Any shock that
aects today's prots will have an eect on tomorrow's liquidity balances. Firms
with higher liquidity balances will produce a higher level of output. So, shocks
to today's prots will aect tomorrow's output.
4.5 Increases in Uncertainty
Our purpose is to identify a pure uncertainty eect on output. We explore
the output eects of a change in rms' perception about the distribution of the
exchange rate, from ~ e to ~ e0. As illustrated in Figure (8), the change considered,
henceforth \increase in tail-risk", implies that the probability mass in the tails
increases, and that in the centre of the distribution falls, while E(~ e) = E(~ e0).
This makes extreme exchange rate outcomes more probable, while keeping the
mean value constant.
Proposition 4. Increases in exchange rate uncertainty lead to a decrease in the
level of output produced.
Proof. The output eect of an increase in uncertainty depends on what happens
to the MBC. If the MBC increases after an increase in uncertainty, then output
will fall. To observe that, see Figure (7): an increase in MBC leads to a decrease
in output produced as the curve MBC shifts upwards (and conversely for a
decrease in MBC).
The eect of increases in exchange rate uncertainty on the MBC at the op-
timum can be calculated by looking at a change in uncertainty that preserves the
density function, f, but shifts the distribution F, and then looking at another
change that preserves F, and alter f. We examine these changes in equations
(42) and (43)13:
13If we denote the change in the distribution by dy, then we can write the total eect on
MBC as dMBC=dy = cdF=dy + (p   (1 + r)w   cF)dln[f=(1   F)=dy]
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 1
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p   (1 + r)w   cF
1
f
> 0 at the optimum. (43)
Both types of changes lead to an increase of the MBC, which implies that output
falls after an increase in exchange rate uncertainty.
4.5.1 Are Firms in Zone I or II?
We have argued that there is an ambiguity in the sign of dMBC=dq. If
the hazard function of the exchange rate distribution is monotonically increasing
or if the rms' solvency exchange rates are in the lower portion of a unimodal
distribution, then dMBC=dq > 0. While the former condition is not easily in-
terpretable, the likelihood of the latter condition holding can be scrutinized. As
21Figure 9: Two Zones: I f0( e
1)  0, II f0( e
1)  0
already argued, bankruptcies are not frequent in practice, and it seems reasonable
to assume that solvency exchange rates are on the left tail of the distribution.
De Brun et al. (2008) gives us a more accurate indication, though only for Ur-
uguay. The authors performed stress tests to a sample of manufacturing rms
in Uruguay. They dened a rm as nancially stressed \whenever an exchange-
rate depreciation made it unable to meet its amortization and interest payments
falling due and or whenever it pushed the rm into a negative equity position"
(De Brun et al., 2008, p.229). In Figure (10) we combine the distribution of an-
nual exchange rate changes (solid line, density measured in the axis on the left),
with their data on the distribution of rms' solvency exchange rates (% of rms
that would be nancially distressed if the exchange rate was to change by x%,
measured on the axis on the right). It is possible to see that for the great major-
ity of rms, the solvency exchange rates are well to the right of the distribution,
probably corresponding to zone II, in our analysis.
5 Extensions
5.1 Firms Producing Tradable Goods
If the risk-neutral rm produces a tradable good `T', with pT = pT=e, where
pT is the international price of the good `T', expressed in foreign currency, then,
the value of the exchange rate (and the riskiness of its distribution) is irrelevant
for the probability of bankruptcy, as long as this rm has assets (revenue) and
liabilities matched in terms of currency denomination. This can be seen by re-
examining the bankruptcy condition, expressed by (14) in the light of the new
22Figure 10: Distribution of actual and solvency exchange rates in Uruguay
setting, and assuming p=1, and e0 = 1 for the sake of simplicity.
(1 + R)B
$e0=~ e1  pq
(1 + R)(w(q)   a)  e0=~ e1  q=~ e1
(1 + R)(w(q)   a)  q (44)
5.2 Soft Budget Constraints
If we examine the episodes of sharp depreciations in the countries under ana-
lysis, the line of argument proposed by this model, that relies on rms intern-
alizing the costs of potential balance-sheet eects could be contested. This is
because, as argued in Section 3.2, it may be ex-post optimal for the government
to bailout debtors that are nancially distressed as a consequence of the extreme
exchange rate. In fact, governments have often acted in support of rms in order
to relax the nancial constraint they faced. For example, in Argentina, after a
sharp real devaluation in 1982 that implied the collapse of a crawling peg system
against the dollar, foreign currency denominated corporate debt was converted
into domestic currency at the pre-devaluation exchange rate, at the expense of the
Argentinean Central Bank. Something similar happened after the abandonment
of the currency board regime in 2002, when the government enforced a compuls-
ory conversion of dollar denominated liabilities up to 100,000 dollars into peso
denominated liabilities at the one-to-one exchange rate, what is known as the
\pesication" of debt. Any potential balance sheet eects were then eliminated
(Galiani et al., 2003, p.344). In Uruguay, after the sharp devaluation in 2002, the
state-owned bank, which is the main creditor to the manufacturing sector, called
for a renegotiation of corporate debt in milder terms. This implied, for example,
23accepting government bonds as a means of debt-repayments at face value when
their market price had plunged to about 60%.14 Thus, suciently liquid rms
faced a substantial reduction of their debt. At the same time, the government
encouraged the private banking sector to oer debt renegotiation alternatives to
the non-banking corporate sector. In Brazil, the \Banco do Brasil" provided some
exchange rate risk hedging opportunities some days before the large devaluation
of the currency in January 1999.15
These type of arrangements are akin to the notion of \soft budget constraints".
According to Kornai et al. (2003), a rm faces a soft budget constraint if there
is a support organization ready to alleviate part or all of the debt, and the rm
managers or owners are aware of this possibility, and internalize it, when making
decisions. In the context of our model, let us assume that the government is
the support organization, and that it acts by exerting pressure on the banking
sector for them to roll over corporate debt. That would mean that rms may
only have to pay a portion  of the debt they face at the beginning of next
period.16 Figure 11 shows the optimal output response to the possibility of a
softening of the budget constraint. If rms only pay a portion  of the debt, that
increases the expected net marginal revenue, and at the same time reduces the
MBC, as the soft budget constraint reduces the rm's solvency exchange rate.
Both eects induce an increase in optimal output. The rst order condition of
the maximization problem of the rm is:
p = (1 + r)w
0(q) + MBC
0 (45)
where MBC0 < MBC.
Figure 11: Firm maximising behaviour with costs of bankruptcy and soft budget
constraints
14Source: Montevideo Stock Exchange.
15Personal communication with Pedro Bonomo, from Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo,
Brazil.
160 <  < 1
24If the government only intervenes when there is substantial exchange rate
uncertainty, and so, important risks of economic and social disruptions, then, an
increase in exchange rate risk will, on the one hand, increase the expected costs
of bankruptcy, thus inducing a more \cautious" behaviour of rms (i.e.: reduce
output), but on the other hand, will decrease , thus inducing the opposite eect
on output. The nal eect on output is therefore, ambiguous, depending on the
relationship between the size of  and the change in uncertainty.
5.3 High Uncertainty: The Unknown Unknowns
\...When, as today, the unknown unknowns dominate, and the eco-
nomic environment is so complex as to appear nearly incomprehens-
ible, the result is extreme prudence, if not outright paralysis, on the
part of investors, consumers and rms. And this behaviour, in turn,
feeds the crisis." Blanchard (2009)17
While Blanchard's quotation refers to the business environment in the nan-
cial crisis of 2008/9, it depicts well that of Southern Cone countries in episodes
of high exchange rate uncertainty. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) seems
to give analytical support to Blanchard. While their focus is on nancial risk
management decisions instead of production decisions, their insight is relevant
for our purposes. The authors show that in the presence of fundamental (or
`Knightian') uncertainty about the economic environment that leads agents to
question their world-views and challenge their models used for decision-making,
there will be an excessive demand for safety on the part of businesspeople, which
leads to disengagements with risky activities and liquidity hoarding.
We argue that in the context of the countries under analysis, high exchange
rate uncertainty implies \structural" uncertainty. The concept of \structural"
uncertainty is borrowed from Arza (2006) and refers to uncertainty about \the
whole set of parameters that denes an economic system at a given time."18 This
set of parameters subject to uncertainty include the new exchange rate regime,
if the current one actually collapses, but also other relevant parameters for the
rm, such as the government reaction in terms of enforcement of property rights,
the level of demand that the rm will face after the severe wealth eects of a
possible depreciation, the access to credit, the access to marketing channels the
rm may use in the event of possible chained bankruptcies, etc..19
Some anecdotal information on the communicational strategy of the govern-
ment around (before and immediately after) drastic exchange rate movements
illustrates how their actions actually tended to increase the perception of uncer-
tainty among decision-makers, in the context of property rights enforcement. The
17The concept of the \Unknown unknowns" has been \coined" by former US Defense Secret-
ary, Donald Rumsfeld, on February 12, 2002, referring to the unstable situation in post-invasion
Afghanistan.
18(Arza, 2006, p. 6). This concept is better suited for our purposes than that of \Knightian
uncertainty" used by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). While latter one is related to
immeasurable risk over a particular variable, the former is related to a set of parameters that
are relevant for the decision-maker.
19It is worth mentioning that most of the episodes of extreme RER movements in the countries
under analysis have had associated output contractions that were large enough to be called \rare
disasters", by Barro (2006) in his analysis of rare disasters and asset markets. In particular,
he identies as disasters, the episodes in Argentina in 1979-1985 and in 1999-2002 and those of
Uruguay in 1981-1984, and 1998-2002
25regularity is that there is no discussion on the \reconstruction" agenda for the
period after the large depreciation has actually taken place. In an attempt to
grant credibility to the about-to-collapse system, governments tend to rule out
the possibility of a depreciation in the rst place, even when the rest of the actors
in the economy (and the economic fundamentals) argue dierently. This is likely
to increase the degree of uncertainty faced by all agents in the economy, and
paralyze those that make production decisions. In November 1982, journalists
asked the General who was acting as de-facto president in Uruguay if there was
going to be a devaluation. His answer was: \No, not even if Martians land here".
Two days after, the dollar tripled its value against the Uruguayan peso. Then,
in 2001, months before the Uruguayan peso was to be devalued again, the Pres-
ident was encouraging people to borrow in foreign currency, arguing that they
were not going to devalue. Something similar happened at the time in Argentina,
where the President persistently claimed they were not going to devalue their
currency. Just a few months later, the currency board was to be abandoned and
the value of the dollar drastically increased. Uncertainty is also likely to increase
if the strategies designed to deal with the potential balance-sheet problems lack
credibility. On this respect, more anecdotal evidence can be presented: in Janu-
ary 2002, after a signicant exchange rate depreciation and an ongoing banking
crisis, the Argentinean government announced a plan according to which bank
depositors were going to recover their deposits in the currency in which those
had been originally denominated. At the same time, they announced that debt-
ors would have their dollar-debts converted automatically into peso-debt (Clarin,
2002). The apparent incompatibility of both announcements, in a period in which
the Argentinean government did not have access to credit markets to nance the
cost of such a combination of proposals, and a depleted stock of foreign exchange
reserves, is likely to have increased the degree of uncertainty perceived by agents
in the economy.
How reasonable is it to assume that in this context, rms will internalize the
behaviour that governments have had in the past and act as if they faced a soft
budget constraint, deciding to increase their exposure to exchange rate risk?
Our conjecture is that rms do not take the soft budget constraint for granted.
Instead, they will react to high uncertainty with conservatism and caution - or
in Blanchard's words: \outright paralysis". Our contention is that the eects of
high uncertainty on output decisions will be dominant over any possible eect of
perceptions of soft budget constraints. Thus, rms will tend to defer production
decisions in a context of high uncertainty.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we proposed a framework to analyze the impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on output decisions when production takes time, and rms n-
ance their working capital needs with dollar debt contracts. The framework seems
to be well suited to understand the output implications of currency mismatches
in the context of economies with undeveloped exchange rate risk hedging instru-
ments, as it explains a stylized fact: output uctuates signicantly with exchange
rate uncertainty.
The main results of this chapter are the following:
First, shocks to prots have persistent eects on output through their eects
26on liquidity balances. The nancial \health" of the rm, understood as the size
of the liquidity balances it holds at the beginning of the period matters for the
output choice. Firms with higher liquidity balances face lower marginal bank-
ruptcy risks. Thus, any shock that aects today's prots, will aect tomorrow's
liquidity balances, and so, rms' output.
Second, when rms face bankruptcy risks, increases in exchange rate uncer-
tainty will increase marginal bankruptcy costs if the rm produces non-tradable
goods (i.e.: exhibits currency mismatches), thus inducing rms to reduce output.
By internalizing the bankruptcy cost, the rm acts as averse to bankruptcy costs.
Because rms are aware that most others are borrowing in dollars, it is reasonable
to think that they may anticipate a government bailout in the event of drastic
exchange rate depreciations. This is because it may be ex-post optimal for the
government to intervene, so as to avoid chained bankruptcies and disruptions in
the payment system. Under those circumstances, the eect of increases in un-
certainty on output are analytically ambiguous, as the higher the likelihood of
extreme exchange rate outcomes, the higher the probability of benetting from
a government bailout. However, our contention is that rms do not take bail-
outs for granted in the event of high exchange rate uncertainty, for those periods
are characterized by lack of information with respect to possible reconstruction
agendas, and a generalized state of \irreducible" uncertainty that leads rms to
disengage with risky activities and hoard liquidity.
This framework can be extended either to explain other rms' decisions in re-
sponse to exchange rate uncertainty (e.g investment) or to analyse other uncertainty-
output channels such as that operating through input or technology prices (i.e.
imported inputs are not easily substitutable and rms may have signed contrac-
tual arrangements on foreign technology licenses).
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